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Abstract
This paper provides new perspectives on USA landlord–tenant contracting, where technical change 
is creating scale economies in farming and farm enlargements, and results that are important to the 
sustainability of land use and environmental quality. We develop a conceptual model of landlord–tenant 
contracting that emphasizes minimizing transactions costs and setting incentives for effort when tenants 
are risk averse, and provide empirical evidence from the USA supporting the model. We find support 
for both models and that landlords’ as well as tenants’ attributes determine whether a contract is crop 
share or cash. We also find that highly erodible land and land that is expected to remain in farming in the 
future are most likely to be operated with share contracts, which include owners’ interests in production 
and management decisions. We then examine evidence showing how contract choice affects the adoption 
of short- versus long-term conservation practices, participation in public conservation programmes, 
and tendencies for conversion of farmland to urban uses. We conclude that, under diverse economic, 
technical, climatic, ecological and political conditions, crop-share contracts have sustainability advantages 
relative to cash rental contracts.
Additional keywords: cash rental contracts, conservation programmes, crop-share contracts, incentives, 
risk sharing, transaction costs
Introduction
In all parts of the world that have private land ownership or private property, a variety 
of institutions have developed to facilitate agricultural production (Roumasset, 1995; 
Oskam & Feng, 2008). This includes the use and management of land for agricultural 
and associated purposes, including the bundling of property rights, which is important 
in Europe (Otsuka et al., 1992). Agricultural land is frequently categorized into the 
following tenure types: owner-operated lands, where the farmer farms only land that 
he owns (without hired labour), tenant-operated lands where the tenant rents all of 
the farm land that he operates, and part-owner operated lands, where the farmer uses 
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owned and rented farmland in his farming operation. For example, in USA agriculture 
in 2003, 62% of the farms were operated by full owners; these were largely small 
farms. Thirty-two percent of the farms were operated by part-owners; these were the 
large farms. Six percent of the farms were operated by tenants who operated small 
farms and rented all of the land that they farmed (Anon., 2006). In 2002, USA farm 
operators rented 38% of their total farmland, which was a decline by 5 percentage 
points relative to a decade earlier.
 Hypothetical reasons for the existence and type of farmland leasing include: 
risk-sharing, incentives for effort, maintenance of productivity or sustainability, 
transaction costs, a credit constraint and screening/sorting. In North America, risk 
sharing (Newberry & Stiglitz, 1979) and transaction costs (Allen & Lueck, 2002) 
have received most of the recent emphasis (Fukunaga & Huffman; in press). The 
institution of farmland tenancy has at times been under attack because of alleged 
inefficient land and labour uses (Otsuka, 2007), but in recent years, new and more 
penetrating thinking about optimal incentive contracting has shown that cash and 
share-leasing of farm land can both be optimal, given the right set of circumstances 
including bundling of rights to land for lease (Slangen & Polman, 2008). However, 
the physical and biological attributes of the land, attributes of the tenant (ability, risk 
preferences, cost of effort, opportunity cost of time, and credit worthiness) and of the 
landlord (risk preferences, management ability, residence location relative to the land in 
question, and asset portfolio) can all be taken into account under efficient contracting. 
However, in developed countries, access to credit and management skills of tenants 
are not central to landlord–tenant contract choice. In the USA, the dominant forms 
of landlord–tenant contracts are cash and share. With a cash lease, the tenant pays 
the landlord a fixed nominal amount per hectare rented for the right to use the land 
for agricultural purposes and then makes all the production and marketing decisions, 
thereby bearing all the risk, but he also obtains all of the net return. With a share lease, 
the landlord provides the land services and the tenant provides the labour, machinery 
services and fuel. Moreover, the landlord and tenant share production and marketing 
decisions, and the most common contract is to share equally (50–50) output produced 
and current production expenses, e.g., fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides.1 Because cash-
lease contracts are fixed in nominal payment for land services, e.g., US$300 (or 190 
Euros) per hectare-year, and share contracts being stated in real terms as a share of 
output and production expenses, share contracts can easily withstand a wider range 
of changes in prices of outputs and inputs and crop yields without the parties needing 
to renegotiate terms. But cash contract terms are more fragile. For example, with 
the dramatic increase in grain and oilseed prices in late 2007 and early 2008, many 
Midwestern USA farmland owners who have cash-lease terms that were set early last 
fall are wishing that they could renegotiate their leases in the spring of 2008. When 
renegotiation has occurred, cash rental rates are substantially higher. 
 The landlord–tenant models developed by agricultural economists have generally been 
behind the curve in applying recent advances in principal-agent models to optimal incentive 
construction in landlord–tenant contracting. Otsuka (2007) hardly mentions principal-
agent models in his recent review of the literature dealing with efficient allocation of land 
across a wide range of environments and countries, and only as an afterthought Roumasset 
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(1995) includes some treatment of a principal-agent model of contracting.
 Although Stiglitz (1974) and Newberry & Stiglitz (1979) applied early versions 
of principal-agent models to landlord–tenant contracting, this was before modelling 
advances by Holmstrom & Milgrom (1987) and Holmstrom (1989), who are associated 
with modern contracting theory, including incentive compatibility and participation 
constraints (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). Their models consist of linear contracts, 
which are robust to unobservable and non-contractable effort, infeasibility of third-
party verification or enforcement and gaming strategies of agents over time. Optimal 
contracts consist of two parts: (1) a fixed ’guarantee’ payment, and (2) an incentive rate 
that is a share of the principal’s payoff. Both agents and principals have an incentive to 
follow through on their agreed upon arrangement or contract because the contracts are 
constructed so that they are better off by doing so. The conceptual papers by Huffman 
& Just (2004) and Fukunaga (2006) and the empirical paper by Fukunaga & Huffman 
(in press) have recently enriched the landlord–tenant contracting literature.  
 The objective of this paper is to provide new perspectives on landlord–tenant 
contracting that are important to the sustainability of land and environmental quality. 
As a reflection of the recent empirical research by Fukunaga & Huffman (in press), 
we develop a conceptual model of contracting that incorporates models of transaction 
costs and incentives for effort with risk sharing (between a tenant and a landlord) 2.
 Furthermore, it will be shown that contract choice is related to the adoption of 
short- versus long-term conservation practices, participation in public conservation 
programmes and tendencies for conversion of farmland to urban uses. The final 
chapter will draw conclusions about future research and policy needs in this area.
Risk sharing and transaction costs: setting incentives in a 
complex environment
This chapter develops a model that encompasses two strands of agency theory: (1) a principal-
agent model with incentives for effort with risk sharing, and (2) a model emphasizing low 
transaction costs. Combining these diverse models into one model of landlord–tenant 
contracting is unusual but insightful. Although it has been argued informally that tenant’s 
risk aversion increases the likelihood of a crop-share contract and landlord’s risk aversion 
increases the likelihood of a cash contract, no one has derived the argument directly from a 
formal model. However, in the next few paragraphs we explicitly derive these conditions. 
 Our model builds upon earlier models by Allen & Lueck (1999), Laffont & 
Martimort (2002) and Huffman & Just (2004). Let us assume the following simple 
production function for farm output (y): 
  y = L + δ       (1)
where L is the tenant’s effort level and δ is a random disturbance term following a 
normal distribution with a zero mean and variance σ2  The landlord is assumed to 
offer a linear contract to the tenant of w = αy + β, where α is the share of output going 
to the tenant and β is the landlord’s guarantee to the tenant, wich can be negative as in 
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cash rented. The tenant’s private cost of effort is assumed to be represented by the simple 
function that is quadratic in effort, – kL2, where k denotes the cost sensitivity of the tenant’s 
effort. Given these definitions, the tenant is assumed to have the following utility function, 
U[α(L + δ ) + β – kL2/2], which is a concave, monotonically increasing function. Finally, 
the tenant’s reservation utility is denoted as U0, which is assumed to be greater than zero. 
Under a second-order Taylor approximation, the tenant’s expected utility from effort L is:
  E[U(α(L + δ ) + β – kL2/2)] = U(E[I]) + E[U'(E[I])• αδ] + –E[U"(E[I])• α2 δ2] (2)
  = U(E[I]) + –U"(E[I])• α2 δ2
where E is the expectation operator, E(I) = α(L + δ ) + β – kL2/2, U’(   ) denotes the first 
derivative of U with respect to I, and U’’(   ) the second derivative. Alternatively, let us 
define CE as the tenant’s certainty equivalent income from I and risk premium RP, 
then CE = E(I) – RP. Expected utility of I now has a first-order Taylor approximation, 
  E[U(I) = U(CE) = U(E[I] – RP) = U(E[I]) – U'(E[I]) RP   (3)
 Therefore, from Equations (2) and (3), RP = – –              α2σ2 = – – rt α2 σ2,
where r =  U’’/U’ is the Arrow-Pratt definition of risk aversion, and rt denotes the 
degree of risk aversion for the tenant (and rl denotes the degree of risk aversion of the 
landlord). Thus, the tenant’s optimal allocation of effort is determined as
  max {E[I] – RP} = max   αL + β – – k(L)2 – – α2 rtσ2      (4)
 Similarly, the landlord’s certainty equivalent income/welfare is given by (1 – α) L –
β – – r1 (1 – α)2 σ2, and under these settings, the landlord sets the sharing rate α that 
the tenant will accept 
   max   (1 – α)L* – β – – (1 – α)2 r1σ2     (5)
  
  L*= arg max   αL + β – – k(L)2 – – α2rtσ2
  αL* + β – – k(L*)2 – – α2rtσ2 ≥ U0
 The first constraint in Equation (5) is the tenant’s incentive constraint providing the 
optimal marginal conditions for his effort, and the second constraint in Equation (5) guarantees
that the tenant is better off with the contract offered than pursuing his next best alternative. 
 Solving the tenant’s optimal incentive constraint, the tenant’s effort is L* = α/k. If β
≠ 0, the tenant’s participation constraint holds with equality (whenever the participation 
holds with inequality, the landlord can reduce the fixed payment so that he is better off) 
and the optimal β = U0 – αL* + – k(L*)2 + – α2 rtσ2. Given these values of L* and β, the 
landlord chooses the sharing rate under the following updated statement:
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  max    – – – k  –   – – α2rtσ2 – – (1 – α)2r1σ2 – U0  (6)
 It can be shown that the general expression for the optimal sharing arrangement becomes:
  α* =  .     (7)
Because α* ≠ 1 unless σ2 = 0, which implies that production is certain, or rt = r1 = 0,
which implies that the tenant and landlord are risk neutral, the optimal contract 
becomes some type of sharing arrangement. 
 It is useful to compare the welfare of the landlord under different contracting 
solutions. Denote total landlord’s welfare under an optimal contract as πCS, where the 
subscript CS denotes crop share. Now suppose that the landlord gains from reducing 
transaction costs (see Allen & Lueck, 1999) for a list of important transaction costs) 
when he uses a cash-rent contract instead of the optimal crop-share contract, and 
denote B as the added landlord benefits under cash rent. Then, the total welfare, when 
the landlord uses cash-rent instead of the optimal crop-share contract, is denoted as:
  πC = – . – – – rtσ2 + B     (8)
 Thus, the landlord is better off under a crop-share contract if and only if
  πCS – πC =               .                          –B > 0   (9)
 One can show that πCS – πC is monotonically increasing in σ2, variance in production, 
and in rt, tenant’s risk aversion, and monotonically decreasing in ri, landlord’s risk 
aversion, and in B. The past literature on contract choice has implicitly relied on this result to 
obtain testable hypotheses about the effects of risk and transaction costs on contract choice.
 Because key parameters in the optimal contract choice equations are not directly 
observable, the empirical contracting literature uses proxy variables for various 
parameters of these equations. Moreover, the authors of these studies normally assume 
very simple linear proxies of the parameters and this undoubtedly leads to approximation 
error. However, given that econometric specifications of these relationships include a 
random disturbance term, the approximation error can be harmlessly included there, 
provided that the regressors are not correlated with the errors. 
An empirical model, data and results
Given the conceptual model of landlord–tenant contracting developed in the foregoing, 
the goal is to formulate an empirical model that can be fitted to a sample of contracts. 
In particular, we present and discuss the empirical model for choice of a crop-share 
contract, discuss the set of variables that relate to risk sharing and then the set of 
variables that relate transaction costs. See Table 1 for the list of variables and definitions.
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Empirical model 
Contract choice is a latent variable contract* for contract type, which is hypothesized to 
have the following economic relationship: 
  contract* = α*xi + β*yj + γ*zij – εij* ,      (10)
where xi denotes a vector of tenant i’s attributes; yi denotes a vector of landlord 
j’s attributes; and zij denotes the vector of local conditions in the area where the 
contracting occurs, such as the contracted land area, the total market value of the 
land and buildings on the contracted land, variability of area crop yields, erodibility of 
area soils, as well as a constant term. These variables serve as proxies for underlying 
conceptual parameters in the conceptual model. Moreover, εij* is a random disturbance 
term that exists in part because our empirical model is at best a rough approximation 
to the conceptual model of landlord–tenant contract choice. However, what can be 
observed is not contract* , but rather, the dichotomous indicator contract
  contract   =                                , or 1 for crop-share, and 0 for a cash lease. (11)
 Our likelihood function then becomes:
  ΠF(α'x1+ β'yj + γ'zij)contractij {1 – F(α'xi + β'yj + γ'zij)}(1–contractij),  (12)
where Fε(v) denotes a cumulative distribution function Fε evaluated at v. Hence, Fε(α’xi
+ β’yj + γ’zij ) gives the  probability of a crop-share contract being chosen, conditional 
on the covariates, x, y and z. For example, if the εijs follow a standard unit normal with 
a mean of 1 and a variance of 0, then F(   ) follows a cumulative standard unit normal 
distribution function. Equation (12), which is the joint probability of the sample viewed 
as a function of the unknown parameters, is denoted as the likelihood function for the 
empirical model. Now maximize the likelihood function with respect to the unknown 
parameters α, β, and γ to obtain parameter estimates of the probit model of crop-share 
choice (Greene, 2003). A positive value for the coefficient of an explanatory variable 
implies that an increase in the associated explanatory variable increases the probability 
that a crop-share contract is the contract choice (and reduces the probability that a cash 
contract is the choice).
Risk-related factors
The erosion of soil from a landlord’s land is a major concern, unless he anticipates 
converting it to non-farm uses soon, and according to Allen & Lueck (1992; 1993; 
1999), a landlord monitoring for overuse of his leased land is an important transaction 
cost facing the landlord. In order to capture the effect of this risk, Fukunaga & 
Huffman (in press) proxy the potential for ‘overuse’ by a land erodibility index for the 
county where the tenant resides. Under the transactions cost motive for contract choice, 
W.E. Huffman and K. Fukunaga
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the landlord is expected to offer a crop-share contract to reduce erosion risk on his land.
 However, if the landlord expects to convert his land to non-farm uses in the near 
future, erosion concerns will be relatively unimportant and he will offer a cash-rental 
contract (Fukunaga & Huffman, in press). This likelihood of conversion to non-farm 
uses can be proxied by the Beale-code land use index, a code that ranges from 1 to 9, 
with 1 indicating the most urbanized areas and 9 indicating the most rural areas. For 
example, if the code is 1, i.e., the land is urban, then it is reasonable for the landlord to 
anticipate conversion of his farmland to non-farm uses soon and he will have greatly 
reduced concerns about erosion under a cash lease. Thus, the landlord will be less 
likely to offer a crop-share lease. In contrast, if the land is located in a remote rural 
area, then it is more likely to remain in agricultural use for the foreseeable future, and 
the landlord is more likely to offer crop-share. Thus, following this concern for future 
productivity of rented land, landlords in areas with higher Beale-code numbers are 
more likely to offer a crop-share contract. 
 As a tenant becomes wealthier, he has larger net worth to withstand a bad harvest 
under crop share, and the general belief is that if his wealth increases, he becomes less 
risk averse and is less likely to accept a crop-share contract. However, as a landlord at 
retirement age gets wealthier, he may prefer to avoid production and marketing risk 
and lease for cash. Using this reasoning, an elderly and wealthy landlord is expected 
to offer a cash lease. Proxies for wealth are the value of farm assets and of agricultural 
land and buildings net of debt (owned assets).  
 One of the important risks of farming is crop yield variability. Fukunaga & 
Huffman (in press) proxy this by an indicator of crop yield variability in the area where 
leased land is located. The USDA’s county level annual yield data over 1990 to 1999 
(Anon., 2005) were converted into a county average standardized yield variability index 
using data for the yields of maize, soya bean, hay, common bean, and other crops. 
Because output units differ across different crops, Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) 
divided the standard deviation of local county yields by their respective mean values. 
Finally, using data for the 10-year average share of harvested hectares for each crop, 
they summed up the standardized deviations and obtained a weighted and standardized 
yield variability index. Then, as the local yield variability index increases, landlords 
are less likely to offer crop-share leases whereas tenants prefer crop share in these 
circumstances. However, if landlords and tenants are risk neutral rather than risk 
averse, an increase in yield variability will not affect the type of contract that they offer 
or accept, but risk-averse tenants will be more likely to accept a crop-share contract and 
risk-averse landlords more likely to offer cash contracts.
Transaction cost factors 
Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) argue that proxies for transaction costs include 
the type of crop-rotation, the number of landlords from which a tenant contracts, 
the hectares of contracted land, the total value of contracted land, the value of farm 
buildings and dwellings on the contracted land, the value of the tenant’s dwelling on 
the contracted land, whether the landlord lives on the contracted land or not, whether 
the landlord lives close to the contracted land or not, and the Beale code for the area 
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where the tenant resides.
 In a grain–oilseed crop rotation, Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) argue that a crop-
share contract is more likely to be chosen because it is relatively easy for the landlord 
and tenant to divide the product from the land, as it is not perishable, and hence each 
of them can market his own share of the product (Allen & Lueck, 1993; 1999). With 
the landlord having easy access to marketing channels, he is more likely to offer a crop-
share contract. On the other hand, if vegetables or fruits are produced on leased land, 
dividing the output between landlord and tenant is more problematic, as the product is 
more perishable, which means that transaction costs are high to the landlord for a crop-
share contract. Hence, under these circumstances, the landlord is less likely to offer a 
crop-share contract.
 Under modern principal agent theory with unobservable effort, optimal contracts 
are constructed to be incentive compatible for the tenant (and landlord). Since 
monitoring is ineffective, it is not undertaken. Under the transaction costs perspective, 
contracts are constructed to reduce these monitoring costs, which decrease the 
likelihood of the landlord offering crop share. Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) proxied 
the landlord-monitoring costs using two variables tied to the location of the landlord 
relative to his land; whether the landlord lives on his leased land or whether he lives 
within 5 miles of his leased land. The idea is that landlords who do not live on or near 
their leased land have higher costs of monitoring the activity of their tenants relative 
to timeliness of field operations and judicious use of the land (Allen & Lueck, 1993; 
1999). Hence, under the transaction cost model, the landlord is less likely to offer a 
crop-share contract, but under the incentive-compatible principal-agent contract, the 
landlord knows that monitoring is unnecessary and his residence relative to the leased 
land is unimportant.
 Externalities may arise with tenants who contract with multiple landowners, as 
is common in the USA and Canada. As the number of contracts a tenant has with 
landlords increases, the greater the risk to any landlord that farming activities on his 
land will be conducted at a suboptimal date. Hence, each landlord is less likely to offer 
a cash contract in these circumstances. Also, as the number of contracted assets (land, 
buildings and dwellings) increases, the importance of the landlord’s land to the tenant 
increases and represents a larger potential loss to opportunistic behaviour. Hence, crop 
share is more likely to be offered and chosen. 
Data 
Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) used as primary data the 1999 US Agricultural 
Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS; Anon., 2005). It is a relatively 
comprehensive data set consisting of tenants’ demographic information, economic 
attributes and household characteristics, and landlords’ demographic information and 
economic attributes. Survey questionnaires were first sent to USA producers/tenants 
included in the 1998 Census of Agriculture. Farmers were asked to answer a set of 
questions and, where relevant, to provide the addresses and names of their landlords. 
Questionnaires were then sent to this list of landlords. Hence, this procedure made it 
possible to identify a tenant and a landlord for every contract in the data set. See Table 1 
W.E. Huffman and K. Fukunaga
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Table 1. Definitions of variables and summary statistics, 1999 US AELOS Data (n = 44,515).
Variables Definitions Mean  SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
contract_type = 1 if contract is cropshare, = 0 if contract is cash rent 0.20 0.40
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regions
NE = 1 if location of tenant’s farm is Northeast region 0.12 0.33
MW = 1 if location of tenant’s farm is Midwest region  0.37 0.48
SR = 1 if location of tenant’s farm is South region 0.35 0.48
WR = 1 if location of tenant’s farm is West region 0.16 0.36
Tenant’s farm type
grain_oil = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is grain and/or oilseed production 0.39 0.49
tobacco_cotton = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is tobacco and/or cotton production 0.12 0.33
vegetable_fruit = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is vegetable and/or fruit production 0.08 0.27
other_crop = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is other crop production 0.08 0.29
beef = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is beef cattle ranching and farming 0.10 0.30
dairy = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is dairy 0.15 0.36
other_animal = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is producing other animals 0.17 0.37
crop_type = 1 if grain_oil=1 or tobacco_cotton=1 0.52 0.50
Other tenant’s attributes
t_age age of tenant 51.65 12.09
t_gender = 1 if tenant is male 0.98 0.12
t_white = 1 if race of tenant is white 0.98 0.14
ind_farm = 1 if type of tenant’s farm is individual farm 0.63 0.48
n_family_members number of family members living in tenant’s household 3.17 1.52
t_n_landlords number of landlords whom tenant contracts with 13.35 19.83
t_total_income_net tenant’s net total income (US$1,000) 206.05 795.27
t_farm_share = 1 if share of farm income in tenant’s household is greater than 75% 0.50 0.50
t_total_assets value of farm and nonfarm assets in tenant’s household (US$100,000) 23.86 67.53
t_share_owned share of number of acres of land owned by tenant (%) 29.64 26.64
t_dwelling_value market value of tenant’s dwelling on contracted land (US$100,000) 0.08 0.31
t_debt_free = 1 if tenant has no debt 0.12 0.33
t_da_50 = 1 if tenant’s farm debt-asset ratio is greater than 50% 0.13 0.34
Landlord’s attributes
l_age age of landlord 65.09 14.47
l_white = 1 if race of landlord is white 0.94 0.23
l_n_tenants number of tenants whom landlord contracts with 1.36 2.82
l_ope_99 = 1 if landlord operated farm or ranch in 1999 0.11 0.32
l_liv_on_farm = 1 if landlord lives on contracted land 0.13 0.34
l_liv_close = 1 if l_liv_on_farm =0 and landlord resides within 8 km from 0.42 0.49
 contracted land
l_farm_income = 1 if landlord’s net farm income is greater than US$25,000 0.06 0.23
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for a list of the variables and their definitions.
 In the data set, the sample unit is not an individual tenant or landlord, but a 
particular contract, and, hence, a tenant may appear more than once in the data set, but 
always in combination with a different landlord. Likewise, a landlord could appear more 
than once if he contracts with more than one tenant. After some refinements, the data 
set included 44,515 landlord–tenant contracts. From the results (Table 1) it appears that 
the tenants were on average 51.6 years of age and 13.5 years younger than the landlords. 
Hence, the majority of landlords associated with our contracts were retirement aged. 
Roughly 70% of the landlords were women, many of them elderly widows whose 
husbands had been farmers. Forty-two percent of landlords lived near their leased 
land, but only 11% lived on the premises. The tenants contracted on average with 13 
landlords, and the landlords associated with these contracts contracted on average with 
only 1.4 tenants. These data are a reflection of what happened in the USA over the past 
four decades: a rapid increase in farm size due to consolidation of existing farmland 
into fewer farming units. Hence, during the post-War II period it has been atypical 
to have landlords holding large tracts of land and each owner leasing land to a large 
number of tenants, as occurred in the post-Civil War era in the southern states of the 
USA. Individual farmers who rent farmland are typically part-owners who use leased 
farmland as a means of acquiring sufficient land to take account of scale size in the use 
of farm machinery.
Empirical results 
Our empirical model of landlord–tenant contracting was fitted (Table 2, column 1). The 
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Table 1. (cont’d)
Variables Definitions Mean  SD
l_farm_share = 1 if share of gross farm income in landlord household is 76% or more 0.08 0.27
l_farm_assets market value of all farm assets owned by landlord (US$100,000) 2.83 9.68
l_total_value market value of all lands and buildings owned by landlord (US$100,000) 5.50 137.79
l_land_owned number of units owned by landlord (40 ha) 5.32 34.55
l_debt_free = 1 if landlord has no debt 0.86 0.35
l_da_50 = 1 if landlord’s farm debt-asset ratio is greater than 50% 0.05 0.21
total_value market value of land and buildings on contracted land (US$100,000) 2.76 9.55
Other factors
yield_variability standardized and weighted production variability for county of 0.26 0.10
 tenant’s residence
average_beale average of Beale code in 1993 and 2003 for county of tenant’s 4.74 2.48
 residence
contracted_area number of units (40 ha) 2.17 10.91
land_erodibility erodibility index for county of tenant’s residence 2.68 2.72
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood estimation of probit models of crop share contract choice for USA Farmland,
1999 US AELOS Data (n = 44,515). 1
 (1) (2) (3)
Explanatory  Contract choice: landlord, Contract choice: no  Marginal effect of regressor
variables tenant and other attributes landlord attributes change on prob. (%) of crops-
   hare [using coefficients in (1)] 2
 Value ln(likelihoodfn)  Value ln(likelihoodfn)
 = 18,573.12 = 18,713.34
Intercept –4.0460*** –3.9085***
Regions
NE –1.2606*** –1.3207*** –0.01717
MW –0.5024*** –0.5264*** –0.00684
SR –0.3806*** –0.4033*** –0.00518 
Farm type
grain_oil 0.3097*** 0.3240*** 0.00422
tobacco�_cotton –0.0075 0.0198 –0.00010 
vegetable_fruit –0.2823*** –0.2919*** –0.00385
beef –0.0454 –0.0263 –0.00062
dairy –0.7333*** –0.7517*** –0.00999
other_animal –0.3118*** –0.3090*** –0.00425
Tenant’s attributes
t_age 0.0002 0.0005 0.000003
t_gender 0.0112 0.0192 0.00015
t_white 0.2403*** 0.2725*** 0.00327
ind_farm 0.0198 0.0186 0.00027
n_family_members –0.0012 –0.0012 –0.00002
t_n_landlords –0.0100*** –0.0109*** –0.00014
t_total_income_net <0.0001** <0.0001*** 0.000001
t_farm_share 0.0625*** 0.0664*** 0.00085
t_total_assets –0.0019*** –0.0018*** –0.00003
t_share_owned –0.0047*** –0.0049*** –0.00006
t_dwelling_value –0.0136 –0.0035 –0.00019
t_debt_free 0.0656*** 0.0642*** 0.00089
t_da_50 –0.0407** –0.0378* –0.00055
Landlord’s attributes
l_age 0.0038***  0.00005
l_white 0.1522***  0.00207
l_ope_99 0.0380  0.00052
l_liv_on_farm –0.0985***  –0.00134
l_liv_close –0.1880***  –0.00256
l_farm_income 0.1760***  0.00240
l_farm_share 0.0069  0.00009
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fact that a sizeable number of coefficients in the equation for crop-share contract are 
statistically significant is evidence that landlords and tenants are risk averse and that 
transactions costs matter. Moreover, the hypothesis that landlords’ attributes are largely 
unimportant to contract choice is rejected. The unrestricted model for this test and the 
restricted model under the null hypothesis are reported in Table 2, columns 1 and 2, 
respectively. The sample value of the χ2- statistic for this test was 280, and the tabled 
value of the χ2- statistic with 13 degrees of freedom at P < 0.05 was 27.7.
 Returning to the results in column 1 Table 2 the following conclusions can be 
drawn: (1) the estimated coefficient for the area yield variability (and significantly 
different from zero) supports the hypothesis that as production variability increases, 
the probability increases that a crop-share contract is chosen, (2) an increase in the 
erodibility index of the land increases the likelihood of share tenancy, suggesting 
that landlords are concerned about conservation of their farmland, (3) the estimated 
coefficient of the tenant’s household income being primarily from farming, increases 
the probability that crop share is chosen, (4) the estimated coefficients of total tenant 
assets and the share of operated land that is owned are negative, implying that crop 
share is less likely to be chosen, and (5) the estimated coefficient for the tenant being 
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Table 2. (cont’d)
 (1) (2) (3)
Explanatory  Contract choice: landlord, Contract choice: no  Marginal effect of regressor
variables tenant and other attributes landlord attributes change on prob. (%) of crops-
   hare [using coefficients in (1)] 2
 Value ln(likelihoodfn)  Value ln(likelihoodfn)
 = 18,573.12 = 18,713.34
Landlord’s attributes
l_farm_assets 0.0387***  0.00053
l_total_value –0.0013***  –0.00002
l_area_owned 0.0006  0.00001
l_debt_free 0.0006  0.00001
l_da_50 –0.0463  –0.00063
total_value –0.0414***  –0.00056
Other factors
yield_ variability 0.3505*** 0.4497*** 0.00048
average_beale 0.0318*** 0.0361*** 0.00043
contracted_area   0.0002 <0.0001 0.000003
land_ erodibility 0.0777*** 0.0796*** 0.00106
1 The one, two, or three asterisks to the right of estimated coefficients indicate that a coefficient is significantly 
 different from zero at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. The reference region in the models is the West of 
 the USA.
2  The evaluation of the marginal effects is at these sample means of the regressors (see Table 1), giving a value 
 of the density function of 0.01362.
Source: adapted from Fukunaga & Huffman (in press).
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debt-free is positive, indicating that crop share is more likely to be chosen. These results 
support risk sharing between landlords and tenants. 
 The tenant’s age does not significantly affect contract choice, which is – as we 
expected – given the pressures for expansion in USA agriculture and landowners 
selecting against risk-averse tenants. However, the age of the landlord is important, with 
older landlords showing a slight preference for crop share, other things being equal.
 If the landlord’s farm income is higher than US$25,000, or the market value 
of farm land and buildings or hectares owned increases, a crop-share contract is 
significantly more likely to be chosen. Holding the above variables constant, as 
the market value of the landlord’s land and buildings on leased land increases, the 
probability of a crop-share lease decreases. These results suggest that landlords are risk 
averse and that risk sharing is also important to them.
 If a tenant’s farm is categorized as a grain–oilseed farm, the probability that 
crop share is chosen increases, and if the tenant’s farm is categorized as either a 
vegetable–fruit farm, a dairy farm or a farm that raises other animals, a crop-share 
contract is less likely to be chosen. If the landlord lives on or close to the contracted 
land, a crop-share contract is significantly less likely to be chosen. If the tenant 
contracts with many rather than one landlord, his transaction costs increase and his 
landlords face a possible tenant-shirking problem or risk of untimely completion of 
key farming activities so cash is more likely to be chosen. If the landlord lives on the 
land he can easily monitor potentially land-degrading activities of a tenant under a 
cash rental lease, which could terminate an otherwise long-term relationship. This 
becomes more difficult if he lives many miles away, in which case he would offer a 
crop-share lease, which has direct incentives for judicious management of the leased 
land. The estimated coefficient for the local Beale code index is positive (and statistically 
significant), indicating that as the area where the leased land is located becomes more 
rural and agricultural, the probability that a crop-share contract is offered increases. 
These results support the transaction costs hypothesis. Previous empirical studies of 
landlord–tenant contracting have largely ignored the attributes of landlords. However, 
as the above summary of results shows, a number of landlord attributes are important 
in contract choice. Furthermore, in a test of the null hypotheses that landlord attributes 
do not matter in explaining contract choice, the hypothesis is rejected at P < 0.01. The 
sample value of the associated χ2-value was 280 (d.f. = 13). The tabled value of the χ2-
value at P < 0.01 was 28. Hence, economic analyses of landlord–tenant contracting 
cannot be taken seriously if they ignore the attributes of landlords – both landlords’ and 
tenants’ attributes are important to understanding real contract choice and sustainable 
contracting relationships.3
 Using the estimated coefficients from regression (1) in Table 2, the marginal 
effect of changing an explanatory variable was computed (Table 2, column 3). In 
assessing the contributions of marginal effects, one must make an assessment of what 
is the relevant unit. For dichotomous variables, comparing the size of the estimated 
coefficients is sufficient (column 1), but for continuous variables, it is useful to look at 
the predicted marginal change associated with a one standard deviation change in the 
explanatory variable (Table 1). With this scheme as a reference, it is clear that region of 
the country and type of farm matter a relatively large amount in contract choice. Among 
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the dichotomous tenant attributes, race is most important, and among the landlord 
attributes, race, living close to the farm, and having a net farm income greater than 
US$25,000 matter most. Among the other variables, market value of all farm assets 
owned by the landlord, the value of land and buildings on the contracted land and the 
land erodibility index have relatively large marginal effects. Looking at the marginal 
effects from a different perspective, if the market value of the landlord’s land and 
buildings on the contracted land were to increase by a factor of 1000, other things being 
equal, the probability that a crop-share contract is chosen would be reduced by half a 
percent. And if the value of a tenant’s total farm and non-farm assets were to increase 
by a factor of 100,000 the probability of a crop-share contract would be reduced by 
one-quarter of a percent. It may, however, be unrealistic to think of such large changes 
while holding all of the other regressors constant.
Discussion
Allen & Lueck (2002) have argued and our results support the fact that the inherent 
tendency for farmland to erode is a major concern to landlords when leasing their land. 
Also, our results show that the location of contracted land relative to urban-rural areas, 
which we interpret as a reflection of the likely future use of the land for agricultural 
versus non-agricultural purposes, is an important factor in contract choice. Keeping 
soil erosion at a low rate and land quality high are important to sustainability of 
land for farming. Moreover, a crop-share contract gives the landowner a role in farm 
production and management decisions, which can moderate a tenant’s aggressive 
farming tendencies to exhaust future productivity. Other literature can be used to 
shed more light on the decision to adopt sustainable farming practices such as the 
use of conservation practices. Some conservation practices have an immediate cost 
saving effect and a longer term saving effect on soil and water erosion. An example 
is conservation tillage, which includes planting systems that maintain a significant 
soil surface cover with crop residues on highly erodible land to reduce soil erosion by 
water or for controlling wind erosion. Other conservation practices, such as grassed 
waterways, contour farming and strip cropping, require investment up front and 
returns in the intermediate to distant future. Building terraces on highly sloped land 
involves large costs and a long-term payoff period. Clearly, private owner−operators 
should have the longest planning horizon when considering investments in 
conservation practices because they can sell the land, but many farmers that own part 
or all of their land choose to quit farming but to retain ownership.
 A number of empirical studies have examined the impact of land tenure on the 
adoption of conservation practices by USA farmers. Rahm & Huffman (1984), Norris & 
Baatie (1987), Belnap & Saupe (1988) and Featherstone & Goodwin (1993) have used as 
the tenure variable ‘the share of a farm’s acres that are rented’ to indicate tenure status 
on USA farms. Others have used dummy variables to identify operators as full-owners, 
owner−renters or full renters (Lynne et al., 1988), or to identify fields as owner-operated 
or tenant-operated (Fuglie & Klotz, 1995). Alternatively, a few studies have conditioned 
on farm operators (Lee, 1980; Lee & Stewart, 1983; Heimlich, 1985), using dummy 
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variables to distinguish full-owner operators, part-owner operators, and non-operator 
landlords. These studies are noteworthy for their lack of evidence other than land 
tenure matters for use of land conserving practices. 
 In contrast, Soule et al. (2000) have shown that the structure of agriculture as 
reflected in land use by USA owners and cash and share tenants is important to 
adoption of conservation practices. In their study of maize producers in the 1996 
Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS; Anon., 2005), they distinguish 
conservation practices according to the timing of costs and returns. They show that 
cash-renters are less likely than owner−operators to use conservation tillage (a residual 
management practice for highly erodible land, which reduces labour, machinery and 
fuel costs now and has longer term effects on soil depth) but that tenants operating 
under a crop-share contract are not.4 This is as expected because under share tenancy 
the tenant usually faces incentives for judicious uses of the land because the landlord 
is involved in production decision making. However, Soule et al. (2000) show that both 
cash and crop-share tenants are less likely than owner−operators to adopt practices 
that provide benefits only over a medium (or long) length time horizon (e.g., grassed 
waterways, strip cropping and contour farming on hillsides). These results support the 
belief that share tenancy has weaker incentives than owner–operators for conservation 
practice requiring buildings or establishing structures.  
 In the USA, where real wage rates have been rising and new technologies have size 
economies, farms are under strong pressure to expand their size of farming operations. 
With private land ownership, retired farmers, widows of farmers, and non-farm 
farmland owners may prefer to hold their farmland as part of a portfolio of assets for 
retirement income rather than to sell it. Hence, it seems implausible to contemplate the 
possibility of only owner–operators. The current value of farmland reflects conversion 
to non-agricultural uses in the future, so current land prices may be high relative to 
cash rental rates or cash equivalent share leases. Hence, farmers at any point in time 
may prefer that some of the farmland is owned by non-farmers because this permits 
broader risk sharing. Owning one’s farmland is not necessary for being a farmer, nor 
is it optimal diversification of asset holdings from risk-return trade-off considerations 
(Anon., 2008).
Conclusions
In countries that have private land ownership, share and cash leases have co-existed 
for decades. Although share-leases are less frequent in USA agriculture today than 50 
years ago, they continue to account for about one-quarter of all leases. Furthermore, in 
the Midwest where farm consolidation has been occurring relatively rapidly and most 
of the leased land is for growing maize and soya bean, roughly one-half of the leases 
are share-leases. Our results have shown that both contracting with a goal of reducing 
transaction costs and setting incentives for effort under risk sharing are needed to 
explain actual contracting in the United States of America. Furthermore, we found 
that attributes of tenants and landlords that affect the size of potential transaction 
costs and risk-sharing incentives affect the probability that a crop-share contract is 
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chosen. Our work furthermore has shown that the attributes of landlords affect the 
contract that is chosen, something that has frequently been ignored in landlord–tenant 
contracting. For example, if landlords live on or close to the land that they lease, the 
rental contract is less likely to be a crop-share one. Also, if the market value of the land 
and buildings contracted increases, the probability of a crop-share contract is reduced. 
Moreover, we summarized results showing that the choice of conservation practices on 
farmland is related to land tenancy: farms operated by owners, share tenants and cash 
tenants see the adoption of soil conservation practices differently, with share tenants 
behaving more like owners than cash tenants. Thus, a hybrid model of landlord–tenant 
contracting is central to sustainable land tenure and land productivity. 
 The share contract remains a contract that is more robust to unexpected changes in 
output prices, input prices and crop yields than the cash lease. The reason is that a fixed 
sharing arrangement sets the rental rate as a share of the output (and pre-determined 
share of production expenses). Hence, these contracts can be expected to be serviceable 
over a much longer time period without modification than a cash rental contract that 
sets as a fixed nominal annual payment per year for the use of land. And in fact, the 
empirical evidence for the USA is that share leases have on average been in effect for 
significantly longer periods than have cash leases. The ideal environment for cash 
leases is one with stable input and output prices and crop yields. 
 So we conclude that under diverse economic conditions crop-share contracts are 
long-run sustainable contracts relative to cash leases. Moreover, they create stronger 
incentives for long-term sustainability of land quality for agricultural purposes because 
of the direct involvement of landlords in production and management decisions. 
Hence, extension agricultural economists should undertake an education programme 
to help land owners better understand the advantages and disadvantages of crop share 
and cash leases under diverse economic, technical, climatic, ecological and political 
conditions. However, for land owners who are in the conservative and late phase of 
their life, cash leases seem likely to provide the certainty of income that they need to 
meet retirement expenses and relief from the burden of participatory management.
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Notes
1. In Iowa under a crop-share lease, the dominant contract is without a fixed term, landlord and tenant 
share fifty–fifty the output produced and production expenses (for seed, liming, fertilizer, herbicide, 
insecticide and any custom pesticide application). See Edwards et al. (2004). It is the custom that if the 
landlord or tenant is going to terminate the lease, notification must be given in August before the next 
crop year, which starts officially 1 March. See Allen & Lueck (1999) for information on share contracts in 
some other locations of the USA.
2 Our landlord–tenant contracts contain an incentive for the landlord and tenant to follow through on 
their agreement, i.e., they are incentive compatible. Also, repeat contracting is important in landlord–
tenant relations and this creates trust between parties.
3 Although the explanatory variables vary in their degree of correlation with each other, this does not 
permit individual explanatory variables from having statistically significant coefficients.
4 Conservation tillage in this study includes any tillage and planting system that leaves 30% or more of 
the soil surface covered with crop residue to reduce soil erosion by water or, for control of wind erosion, 
maintains at least 1120 kg per hectare of small-grain-residue equivalent on the surface throughout the 
critical wind erosion period.
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